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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS CERTIFIED
Issue No. 1: What is the nature and scope of a party's interest in marital property

,..

as of the filing of a divorce complaint - contrasted with the nature and scope of such
interest upon the entry of a divorce decree allocating such marital property? Stated

,..

differently, upon the filing for divorce, is a spouse's interest in marital property merely
contingent, unliquidated, and inchoate until the entry of a divorce decree creating a
vested right to receive a specific sum of money or a specific marital asset?

Issue No. 2: Is an individual entitled to an exemption under Utah Code Ann. 78B5-505(l)(a)(xv) in money or other assets payable to that individual as an alternate payee
under a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)? Stated more simply, is the Debtor
entitled under Utah law to exempt the Retirement Plan Proceeds?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
11 U.S.C. § 541 governs property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Section

~~

54l(a)(l) states:
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all of the following property, wherever located
and by whomever held: (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this
section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505( 1)(a)(xv) governs an exemption claimed by the
Debtor:

An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property: (xv) the interest
of or any money or other assets payable to an alternate payee under a qualified

,,..

,...
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domestic relations order as those terms are defined in section 414(p), Internal
Revenue Code.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(1)(a)(xiv) governs an exemption claimed by the
Debtor:
An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property: (xiv) except as
provided in Subsection ( 1)(b), any money or other assets held for or payable to the
individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in
Section 40l(a), 40l(h), 40l(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), 414(e), or
457, Internal Revenue Code.

.....

Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-505( 1)(b) delineates an exception to the applicability of
(@ •

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv):
The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(xiv) does not apply to: (i) an alternate
payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as those terms are defined in
Section 414(p), Internal Revenue Code; or (ii) amounts contributed or benefits
accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within one year before the debtor files for
bankruptcy. This may not include amounts directly rolled over from other funds
which are exempt from attachment under this section.

@ ~

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a case involving a debtor's interest in a pre-bankruptcy property settlement
as part of a divorce proceeding. In 2012, the Deborah Michelle Kiley (the "Debtor")
commenced a divorce proceeding against her fonner spouse. 1 The case was later
bifurcated.2 On August 20, 2015, a mediated settlement conference was held, and the
Debtor and her fonner spouse entered into a stipulation regarding, among other things,

,._.
l

@

2

Record at 287.
Record at 287.
2

~

Ci;
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the distribution of certain marital assets (the "Property Settlement").3 As part of the
Property Settlement, the Debtor was entitled to receive approximately $225,000, which
was the approximate value of the Debtor's former spouse's retirement accounts. 4
The next day, after entering into the Property Settlement, but prior to obtaining an
order from the trial court, and prior to obtaining a qualified domestic relations order, the
Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Bankruptcy Court"). Upon
filing her petition for bankruptcy relief, all legal and equitable interests of the Debtor
became property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. The Trustee asserts that the Property
Settlement is non-exempt property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. The Debtor asserts
that the Property Settlement is not property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate or is
exempt under either Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv) or (xv). Thus, the dispute
involves two issues: (1) what interest, if any, did the Debtor hold in the Property
Settlement on the Petition Date, and (2) is the Debtor entitled to an exemption in the
Property Settlement under Utah law.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Certification

The Debtor filed for divorce in 2012. 5 The Debtor and her former spouse engaged
in what appears to be a heavily contested and litigious divorce proceeding, and the case
was ultimately bifurcated. 6 On August 20, 2015, the Debtor and the Debtor's former

3
4

5
6

Record at 287.
Record at 287.
Record at 287.
Record at 287.
3
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....
spouse attended a mediated settlement conference and stipulated to, among other things,
the distribution of marital property. 7 As part of the stipulation, the Debtor was entitled to
receive approximately $225,000, which was the approximate value of the Debtor's
~

former spouse's retirement accounts. 8
On August 21, 2015, the day after entering into the stipulation, the Debtor filed
her voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 The Debtor did

~

,..,
not disclose the stipulation or the underlying divorce proceeding on the statements and
schedules she filed with the Bankruptcy Court. JO On September 23, 2015, unbeknownst

~

,_

to the Trustee, the State Court entered a Supplemental Decree approving the stipulation
of the parties. 11 On October 7, 2015, the Debtor's 341 meeting of creditors was held and,
in response to questioning by the Trustee, the Debtor first disclosed the stipulation and
pending divorce proceeding to the Trustee. 12 The Trustee directed the Debtor to amend
her bankruptcy schedules and provide the Trustee with a copy of the divorce decree. 13

@ ._

On December 4, 2015, the State Court issued a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (the
"ODRO"), which provided that the funds would be paid in a lump sum to the Debtor, and
that the Debtor assumed sole responsibility for the tax consequences of the distribution
under the QDRO. 14 The Debtor did not amend her statements and schedules to include

~

7
8

(i

9

10

II
~

12

13

@

14

,_
@

Record at 287.
Record at 287, Trustee's Exs. I and 2.
Record at 288.
Record at 16.
Record at 287-88.
Record at 71-72.
Record at 82-85.
Record at 288.
4
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the Property Settlement until December 7, 2015, after the Supplemental Decree and
QDRO were entered, at which time the Debtor claimed the funds awarded to her as part
of the Property Settlement were exempt under Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(a)(l)(xiv). 15
After the Trustee objected to the Debtor's claim for exemption, the Debtor filed a
response stating that the claim of exemption under (xiv) was "in error", and amended her
schedules to instead claim an exemption under Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(a)(l)(xv). 16
After the Trustee objected to the Debtor's claim of exemption under subsection (xv), the
Debtor asserted that she was entitled to claim the exemption under either (xiv) or (xv),
and further asserted that the Property Settlement was not property of the Debtor's
bankruptcy estate. 17
After extensive briefing on the Debtor's various theories and claims of exemption,
which have resulted in the Trustee filing at least 8 briefs to address each of the theories
and claims, the Bankruptcy Court certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court to
determine (I) what interest the Debtor held in the Property Settlement on the Petition
Date, and (2) whether such interest allows the Debtor to exempt the Property Settlement
under Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xv), or under Utah law generally. 18

15
16

17
18

Record at 289.
Record at 289.
Record at 86-92.
In its Certification Order, the Bankruptcy Court has specifically referred to subsection
(xv), but has also questioned whether the property settlement is under Utah law
generally. Because the Debtor has also claimed the Property Settlement is exempt
under (xiv), the Trustee has provided an analysis under both subsection (xv) and
subsection (xiv).

Ill/\

5
4821-S147-374S\4

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT FOR ISSUES ON REVIEW
'The Divorce Proceeding
On February 7, 2012, the Debtor filed a petition for divorce in the Third Judicial
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the "State Court"), styled as Deborah Michelle
Marrott n/k/a Kiley v. Jarod R. Marrett, Case No. 124900672 (the "Divorce
Proceeding"). 19 The Divorce Proceeding was later bifurcated pending resolution of
issues related, in part, to the distribution of marital property. 20
The Debtor's former spouse had a 40l(k) plan with his employer, Kirton &
McConkie (the "40Hk)"), established under the Alliance Benefit Group North Central
States, Inc. Defined Contribution Volume Submitter Plan and Trust and ERISA. 21
On August 20, 2015, a mediated settlement conference was held, and a State Court
~ ~

Commissioner approved a stipulation between the Debtor and her former spouse related
to a division of their marital property which awarded, in relevant part, to the Debtor all of
the value in any and all of her former spouse's retirement accounts (the "Property
Settlement"). 22

19
~

20

21

@

22

Record at 287.
Record at 287.
Record at 287.
Record at 287.
6

~

<i
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On September 23, 2015, the State Court executed its Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (the "Findings ofFact"). 23 Also on September 23, 2015,
the State Court executed its Supplemental Decree of Divorce (the "Supplemental
Decree"). 24
The Findings of Fact and Supplemental Decree both provide that the Debtor's
fonner husband "shall pay for any costs associated with the preparation of a QDRO ... or
transfer of the retirement funds into Petitioner's possession."25
On December 4, 2015, the State Court executed a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (the "ODRO"). 26 The QDRO provides that:
"The Plan shall pay, in lump sum, the amount designated in paragraph 7 of this
QDRO, 100% of the Participant's account, less the value of any outstanding loans,
as of the date of segregation. The Participant shall assume any and all outstanding
loans on the account. The Plan shall pay this amount as soon as administratively
feasible."
"Deborah Michelle Kiley(' Alternate Payee') is the alternate payee for purposes of
this QDRO." 27

,.,
GP
23
24
25

26
27

Record at 287; Trustee's Ex. 1.
Record at 288; Trustee's Ex. 2.
Trustee's Exs. I and 2.
Record at 288, Trustee's Ex. 3.
Record at 288, Trustee's Ex. 3.

,,..,.
(iv

7
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@

The Bankruptcy Case
0i

The Debtor filed a Petition seeking relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
on August 21, 2015 (the "Petition Date"), and on that same day filed her Statement of
Financial Affairs and Schedules ("'Original Statements and Schedules"). 28
On the Petition Date the funds related to the Property Settlement were held in the
401(k). On the Petition Date, the Debtor was not a participant in the 401(k). 29
On the Petition Date, the State Court had not entered an Order approving the
Property Settlement, the Supplemental Decree, or the QDRO. 30
On October 7, 2015, the Debtor's 341 meeting of creditors was held and
concluded, at which the Debtor appeared with counsel. 31
At the 341 meeting of creditors the Debtor disclosed that she was involved in a
divorce proceeding, and disclosed her interest in the Property Settlement. The Trustee
directed the Debtor to amend her Original Statements and Schedules to reflect her interest
~

•

in the Property Settlement and to provide the Trustee with a copy of the ruling related to
her claim in her former spouses' 40l(k). 32
On December 7, 2015, the Debtor filed amended Schedules, including an
Amended Schedule B listing an interest in "'Retirement: 40 I K" in the amount of
$225,142.00, and an Amended Schedule C, claiming an exemption in "'Retirement:

....
@
28

,,..

29

30
31

@

32

..
@

Record at 288; Trustee's Ex. 5.
Record at 288.
Record at 290.
Record at 53.
Record at 82-85; Trustee's Ex. 6.
8
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401K" under Utah Code Ann.§ 788-5-505(l)(a)(xiv) in the amount of$225,142.00 (the
"First Amended Schedules"). 33
On January 5, 2016, the Trustee filed an Objection to Claimed Exemption (the
"First Objection"), stating that the Debtor does not qualify for an exemption under
Section 78B-5-505(I)(a)(xiv). 34
On January 6, 2016, the Debtor filed a Response to the Trustee's Objection to

Exemption, stating in part that "[t]he exemption claimed [in the First Amended
Schedules] was done in error" and asserting that the Debtor "may claim the material
exemption in U.C.A. § 788-5-S0S(xv) .... " 35
Also on January 6, 2016, the Debtor filed a second Amended Schedule C,
removing the claimed exemption in ''Retirement: 401 K" under§ 788-5-505(1 )(a)(xiv)
and instead claiming an exemption under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505( 1)(a)(xv) in the
amount of$225,142.00 (the "Second Amended Schedules"). 36
On January 19, 2016, the Trustee filed a Reply to Debtor's Response to Trustee's

Objection to Claimed Exemption. 37
On February 5, 2016, the Trustee filed the Chapter 7 Trustee's Objection to

Debtor's Amended Claim ofExemption, stating that the Debtor is not entitled to an

-

(@iJ

33
34

35

36
37

Record at 289; Trustee's
Record at 289; Trustee's
Record at 289; Trustee's
Record at 289; Trustee's
Record at 65-68, 289.

Ex. 7.
Ex. 8.
Ex. 10.
Ex. 9.

,.,,.
~
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,..
~

exemption under Section 78B-5-505(l){a)(xv) because the exemption applies to the payor
under a qualified domestic relations order, not the alternate payee. 38
On February 10, 2016, the Debtor filed the Debtor's Response to Trustee's
Objection to Exemption. 39
On February 22, 2016, the Trustee filed the Reply to Debtor's Response to
Trustee's Objection to Claimed Exemption. 40
CJj

On August 29, 2016, the Trustee filed the BriefIn Support of Trustee's Objection
to Claimed Exemption. 41
On September 27, 2016, the Debtor filed the BriefIn support ofDebtor's Claimed
Exemptions and Property Constituting the Bankruptcy Estate. 42
On October 11, 2016, the Trustee filed the Reply to Debtor's Brief In Support of
Debtor's Claimed Exemptions and Property Constituting the Bankruptcy Estate. 43
On December 12, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing and requested
@ .-

additional briefing. 44
On January 17, 2017, the parties filed simultaneous briefing. 45

@

...

38
39

40
41
42

(j

"'

43
44
45

Record at 289-90; Trustee's Ex. 11 .
Record at 290; Trustee's Ex. 12.
Record at 290; Trustee's Ex. 13.
Record at 114-127.
Record at 199-223.
Record at 232-243.
Record at 244-247.
Record at 255-284.
10

~

@
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On January 23, 2017, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. The Court requested
additional supplemental briefing by the parties to be filed by February 6, 2017. 46
The Trustee filed the Second Supplemental BriefIn Support of Trustee's Objection

to Claimed Exemption on February 6, 2017. 47 The Debtor did not file a brief.

On June 7, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Certifying State Law
Questions to Supreme Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On the Petition Date, all legal and equitable interests of the Debtor became
property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l). 48 Under
Utah law, the Debtor held an equitable interest in marital assets prior to the entry of a
divorce decree, and that equitable interest became property of the Debtor's bankruptcy
estate. 49 Alternatively, and additionally, the Debtor held a contractual right to payment
under the Property Settlement that became property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. 50
The Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement, as an equitable interest in marital
property or as a contractual right to payment, is not exempt under Utah Code Ann.
§§78B-5-505(xiv), (xv), or otherwise.

46

47
48

49
50

Record at 296.
Record at 300-307.
In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2010).
See Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1983).
In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1207.
11
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A.

On The Petition Date the Debtor Held an Equitable Interest In Marital
Property that Became Property of the Debtor's Bankruptcy Estate.

Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon filing a petition for
bankruptcy relief, all legal and equitable interests of a debtor become property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. st Under Utah law, the Debtor had an equitable interest in
marital property as of the Petition Date, irrespective of the fact that a divorce decree had
@

.-

not yet been entered. 52 Such interest was not contingent, unliquidated, or inchoate, as it
is not the divorce decree that creates the equitable interest; the divorce decree merely
determines the manner in which the marital property is distributed. 53 However, even if
the Debtor's equitable interest in marital property was contingent, unliquidated, or
inchoate, such interest would still be property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. 54
8.

Alternatively, the Property Settlement Awarded the Debtor a
Contractual Right to Payment, Not an Interest in Her Former Spouse's

40l(k).
Prior to the Petition Date the Debtor and the Debtor's former spouse entered into
the Property Settlement, which gave the Debtor a right to payment of the value of her

,-.
51

@

52

i-.

@

53
i-.

@

54

See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
See West v. Christensen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120961 at * 18-19 (D. Utah Aug. 1,
2017) (''the name in which title is held is not conclusive to this classification [as
marital property], and a decree of divorce need not first be entered before it is
considered jointly owned, or marital property.") see also Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d
at 163 ("[T]he 'equitable interests of the debtor,' prior to the entry of the trial court
order, were all of the property interests held jointly or separately by the respondent
and the appellant.").
See id.
See In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1207; Redmond v. Lentz & Clark, P.A. (In re Wagers),
355 B.R. 268, 276 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006) (''In any event, even a contingent,
reversionary interest is included in a debtor's estate under§ 541.").
12
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fonner spouse's retirement account(s). 55 The Property Settlement created a contractual
right to payment from the Debtor's fonner spouse, but did not create a direct, beneficial
interest in her former spouse's 40l(k), which could only be done via a qualified domestic
relations order. Thus, the Debtor's contractual right to payment became property of the
Debtor's bankruptcy estate on the Petition Date. 56
C.

The Property Settlement is Not Exempt Under Utah Law.

The Debtor has claimed two specific exemptions in the Property Settlement. First,
the Debtor asserts that the Property Settlement is exempt as "retirement funds" under
subsection (xiv). Second, the Debtor asserts that she is entitled to an exemption in the
Property Settlement under subsection (xv) as an "alternate payee." Neither of these
assertions are supported by the statutory language of the Utah Code. 57
Exemptions are detennined as of the Petition Date. On the Petition Date the
Debtor held an equitable interest in marital property and a contractual right to payment
from her former spouse. Neither interest is exempt under Utah Code Ann.§ 788-5505(1 )(a)(xiv), (xv), or otheiwise.
The Debtor first claimed an exemption in the Property Settlement under

55
56

57

Trustee's Exs. 1 and 2.
See In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1207; Brumfiel v. Lewis (In re Brum.fie/), 2015 Bankr.
LEXIS 3477 at *12 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Oct. 8, 2015) ("Legal claims and causes of
action, pending or potential, that a debtor may possess as of the petition date are
clearly within the scope of§ 541. ").
Although the Bankruptcy Court specifically addressed subsection (xv) in its
certification to this Court, the question asked more generally if the Debtor is entitled
to exempt the Retirement Plan Proceeds. Thus, the Trustee has addressed both
subsection (xv) and subsection (xiv).
13
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subsection (xiv), asserting that the Property Settlement was "retirement funds." The
Debtor does not qualify for this exemption because the Property Settlement is not an
interest in the 40l(k}, nor is the Property Settlement held for or payable to the Debtor as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan. The Debtor admits she is not a participant
in the retirement accounts, and the Property Settlement does not, and could not, grant the
Debtor a beneficial interest in the retirement accounts absent issuance of a QDRO.
Moreover, even if the Debtor had obtained a QDRO prior to the Petition Date, subsection
(l)(b) specifically excludes funds payable to an alternate payee from subsection (xiv).
G@ ~

Thus, the Debtor cannot claim this exemption.
Second, the Debtor claimed an exemption under subsection (xv), asserting that she
is entitled to the exemption as an "alternate payee" under the post-petition QDRO. The
Debtor is not entitled to an exemption under subsection (xv) because (1) under the plain
language of the statute, the individual entitled to claim this exemption is not the alternate

~

"'

payee, but the payor, or (2) the Debtor was not an alternate payee on the Petition Date.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
Section 54l(a)(l) provides that all legal and equitable interests of the Debtor
become property of the bankruptcy estate. 58 Under Tenth Circuit precedent, section 541
is broadly construed to include all property interests whether vested or contingent, and
"even contingent interests that may not vest for years at the time of their creation are not

SS

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l).
14
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necessarily excluded." 59 As such, all claims and interests, even if contingent,
unliquidated, or reversionary, are property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. 60
I.

THE DEBTOR HELD AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN MARITAL
PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE, WHICH
BECAME PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR'S BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

A.

The Debtor's Equitable Interest In Marital Property Is Property of the
Debtor's Bankruptcy Estate.

On the Petition Date, the Debtor held an equitable interest in marital property that
was not contingent, unliquidated, inchoate, or merely speculative, and such interest is
property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate under§ 541. 61 The Debtor's interest existed
irrespective of the status of the divorce proceeding and, under Utah law, a divorce decree
was not necessary for the Debtor's equitable interest to exist. 62
In Rogers v. Rogers, a factually similar case, this Court specifically addressed the
effect of Utah state matrimonial law when a bankruptcy is filed in the midst of a divorce
proceeding. In Rogers, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the nature of a spouse's

59

60

In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1207.
Id.; see also In re Brum.fie/, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3477 at *12 ("Legal claims and

61

causes of action, pending or potential, that a debtor may possess as of the petition date
are clearly within the scope of§ 541."); Redmond v. Lentz & Clark, P.A. (In re
Wagers), 355 B.R. 268, 276 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006) ("In any event, even a
contingent, reversionary interest is included in a debtor's estate under§ 541.").
See Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d at 163; Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 1126, 345 P.3d
566, 600 (Utah 2015) ("Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by
parties to a marriage is marital property, owned equally by each party.")
Id.; West v. Christensen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120961 at *13-14.

62

15
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(if}

interests in marital property where one spouse files for bankruptcy prior to the entry of a
trial court order dividing marital property:
Under Utah law, property divisions are ordered according to equitable principles,
not merely according to legal title, so that all property possessed by the parties,
both jointly and separately, may be considered by the trial court. Therefore, the
"equitable interests of the debtor" prior to the entry of the trial court order, were
all of the property interests held jointly or separately by the respondent and the
appellant. These interests became the "estate" of the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 541
and therefore were subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court.63
Thus, although a spouse may not hold a legal, titled interest in marital property
prior to entry of a divorce decree, the spouse holds an equitable interest in marital

Gi ~

property as it is acquired. 64 Recently, the Utah Federal District Court applied this
analysis in the bankruptcy context in West v. Christensen. In West v. Christensen, the
District Court rejected the argument that a spouse holds no interest in marital property
unless and until a divorce decree is entered, stating: "the name in which title is held is
not conclusive to this classification, and a decree of divorce need not first be entered

@ "'

before it is considered jointly owned, or marital property."65 The District Court further
stated "the presumption as to equitable ownership of marital property is that each spouse
owns an undivided one-half equitable interest in marital property, notwithstanding legal
title, that is subject to equitable distribution. " 66

•

63
64

@

65
•

@

66

Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d at 163.
Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23 at ,r 126, 345 P .3d 566, 600 (Utah 2015) ("Prior to the
entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by parties to a marriage is marital
property, owned equally by each party.")
Westv. Christensen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120961 at *19.
Id. at *32. See also DeAvila v. DeAvila, 2017 UT App 146 at ,r 15 (Utah App. 2017)
("Utah law further presumes that property acquired during the marriage is marital
property subject to equitable distribution."); Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373,
16
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Thus, under Utah law the Debtor held an equitable interest in marital property
prior to the entry of a divorce decree. Such interest was not contingent, unliquidated, or
inchoate, except in the sense that, prior to division of the property, the actual property to
be transferred to the spouse had not yet been determined. 67 However, even to the extent
the Debtor's equitable interest was contingent, unliquidated, or inchoate, such interest
would still be property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541. 68
B.

The Property Settlement Gave the Debtor a Contractual Right to
Payment That Became Property of the Debtor's Bankruptcy Estate.

The day before the Petition Date, the Debtor entered into the Property Settlement
which gave her a contractual right to payment from her former spouse for the value of the
40l(k).69 Under the plain language of the Property Settlement, the Debtor is entitled to
the "value" of the retirement accounts in the amount of $225,142, and the Debtor's
former spouse is required to pay the cost to transfer such funds into the Debtor's
possession. 70 Importantly, the Property Settlement does not require the Debtor's former
spouse transfer the funds into the Debtor's retirement account or via a QDRO, only that
he transfer the funds to the Debtor. Nor does the Property Settlement require the

,r 26, 993 P.2d 887 (the trial court has "broad equitable power to distribute marital
61

68

69
70

property, regardless of who holds title").
See West v. Christensen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120961 at n. 4 (noting that Utah law
does not prohibit a party to a divorce action from transferring assets during the
pendency of the divorce proceeding, but transfer of such property does not extinguish
the spouse's equitable interest, which would have to be satisfied by a distribution of
other assets in the divorce proceeding).
In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1207; see also In re Brum.fie/, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3477 at
*12; In re Wagers, 355 B.R. at 276.
Record at 287; Trustee's Exs. 1 and 2.
Trustee's Exs. l and 2.
17
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Debtor's former spouse to actually use the funds in the 40 I (k) to pay the Debtor. Had the
Debtor's former spouse liquidated the 40l(k) prior to paying the Debtor, or otherwise
failed to pay the Debtor, the Debtor would have had a cause of action against her former
spouse and to the remainder of the marital estate, but not against the 40l(k). 71 Thus, the
Property Settlement gave the Debtor a contractual right to payment from her former
spouse for the value of the 40l(k).

c.

The Property Settlement Did Not Give the Debtor A Direct, Beneficial
Interest in the 401(k), and Is Not A Right To Be Named Alternate
Payee.

The Debtor has made conflicting arguments concerning the nature of the Debtor's
interest in the Property Settlement. The Debtor has asserted that she held (I) the right to
receive her share of her former spouse's 401(k) (which would be a right to equitable
distribution); 72 (2) a direct interest in the 40l(k); 73 and (3) the right to be named an
alternate payee. 74
As discussed above, the Trustee does not dispute that the Debtor held an equitable
interest in marital property. However, such an interest does not, and could not, give the
Debtor a direct interest in her former spouse's 40l(k). 75 State matrimonial law cannot

71

72
73
74
75

See West v. Christensen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120961 at n. 4.
Record at 87, 220.
Record at 210,211,220.
Record at 211,212, 217, 222.
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 847 (1997); see also In re Burgeson, 504 B.R. 800,
804-5 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2014) (where a debtor files a bankruptcy petition prior to
obtaining a QDRO or divorce decree, the debtor holds only an interest in equitable
distribution of marital property, not a beneficiary interest in an ERISA-qualified
retirement account).
18
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supersede the federal requirements under ERISA. 76 Nor does the Property Settlement
(ii

purport to grant the Debtor a direct interest in the 40l(k). It states: "The [Debtor] is
awarded all of the value in any and all of the [former spouse's] retirement accounts." 77
The Debtor's interest is not in the retirement accounts directly, but in the value of such
accounts. Thus, the Debtor's interest is simply a contractual right to payment.
Inexplicably, the Debtor contradictorily asserts that her interest in the Property
Settlement is not a right to payment of the value of the 40l(k), but instead the "right to be
named alternate payee."78 This assertion is not supported by the plain language of the
Property Settlement or common sense. The Property Settlement does not require that the
Debtor be named as an alternate payee, but simply provides that the Debtor's former
spouse is responsible for the cost of transferring the funds to the Debtor, or for the cost of
a QDRO. 79 The Property Settlement does not require that the Debtor be paid as an
alternate payee, or that the funds be transferred to her as an alternate payee. Likewise,
the Property Settlement does not require the Debtor's former spouse to pay her the value
of the 40l(k) from proceeds of the 40l(k); he is free to pay her from any other source he
may have availahle.80 Moreover, if the Property Settlement only gave the Debtor a right
to be named alternate payee, she would have no recourse in the event that her former

76

77

78
79

80

Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854 (holding that state law claims are preempted by
ERISA); see also In re Burgeson, 504 B.R. at 804 ("a spouse can be conferred

beneficiary status, but only via a QDRO entered prior to the petition date").
Trustee's Exs. 1 and 2.
Recordat211,212,217,222.
Trustee's Exs. 1 and 2.
See Trustee's Exs. 1 and 2.
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spouse liquidated or diminished the value of the 40 I (k) prior to execution of a QDRO, so
long as she was ultimately named as "alternate payee." If the parties wished to draft the
Property Settlement to only grant the Debtor the right to become an alternate payee, they
could have done so. However, the Debtor cannot now retroactively change the tenns of
the Property Settlement in an attempt to reclassify her interest as exempt. 81
II.

THE DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS NOT
EXEMPT UNDER UTAH LAW.

The Debtor has claimed the Property Settlement exempt under two separate
subsections of the Utah Exemptions Act: Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xv) and
(xiv). The Bankruptcy Court has certified the question of whether the Property
Settlement is exempt under subsection (xv) specifically, but has also questioned whether
@ •

the Property Settlement is exempt under Utah law generally. Thus, the Trustee has
analyzed both subsection (xv) and subsection (xiv) below.
A.

The Debtor's Interest In the Property Settlement Is Not Exempt Under
78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv).

The Debtor originally claimed the Property Settlement exempt under Utah Code
Ann. §78B-5-505( 1)(a)(xiv). Section 78B-5-505(1 )(a)(xiv) states that "except as
provided in Subsection (l)(b)," a debtor is entitled to an exemption in ''any money or
other assets held for or payable to the [debtor] as a participant or beneficiary from or an

81

...
Gf

See Hal Taylor Assocs. V. Union America, Inc., 651 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)
(citations omitted); see also Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

("This court cannot rewrite the contract because [the] appellant failed to include
language to protect her rights.").
20
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interest of the [debtor] as a participant or beneficiary in" certain retirement plans. 82
Subsection l(b) of§ 78B-5-505 states, in relevant part, that: "The exemption granted by
Subsection (l)(a)(xiv) does not apply to: (i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic
relations order, as those tenns are defined in Section 4 l 4(p), Internal Revenue Code ...."
The Debtor is not a participant in the 40l(k). 83 Thus, in order to qualify for the
exemption under subsection (xiv), the Debtor must show that the Property Settlement
constitutes money or assets held for or payable to the Debtor, or an interest of the Debtor,
as a beneficiary in a retirement plan. 84
Here, the Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement is not due to beneficiary
status in a retirement plan. The Debtor has asserted that, as a result of her marital status,
she obtained beneficiary status and a direct ownership interest in the 40 I (k). 85 This
assertion has been plainly rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 86 The Debtor did
not, and could not, have obtained beneficiary status in the 401 (k) as a result of her marital
status. 87 Thus, although Utah matrimonial law gives the Debtor an equitable interest in

82
83

84
85

86

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv) (emphasis added).
Trustee's Exs. 3 and 4.
See Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv) and (l)(b).
Record at 210, 211, 220. The Debtor has also asserted that she obtained beneficiary
status by way of a death beneficiary designation. See Debtor's Ex. 1. To the extent
this assertion is true, it is irrelevant to the current dispute. The Debtor's former
spouse is not deceased, and the Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement is not
payment to the Debtor as a death beneficiary, is not as a result of her designation as
death beneficiary, and does not affect her rights (to the extent any exist) as a
designated death beneficiary.
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847 ("ERISA does not confer beneficiary status on
nonparticipants by reason of their marital or dependent status.")

s1 Id.
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the distribution of marital property, it cannot grant the Debtor a beneficiary interest in the
40l(k) absent a valid QDRO. 88 The Debtor did not obtain a QDRO prior to the Petition
Date, and even if she had, subsection (xiv) is not applicable to interests obtained via a
QDRO.s9
The Property Settlement is an obligation by the Debtor's former spouse to transfer
to her the value of his retirement accounts. This value is not a retirement plan, much less
money held for or payable to the Debtor as a participant or beneficiary in a plan. The
Property Settlement did not grant the Debtor an interest in a retirement account, but
@ ,..._

simply awarded her the value of the retirement account, represented to be $225,142. 90
Additionally, even if§ 78B-5-505( 1)(a)(xiv) were implicated by the creation of a
valid QDRO prior to the Petition Date (which did not occur), the exemption does not
apply under the express language of Subsection I(b) because the Debtor would be an
alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order. Moreover, the Debtor

<j ~

affirmatively decided to file her bankruptcy petition prior to entry of the Supplemental
Decree and prior to the issuance of a QDRO. Although that decision negatively impacts
the Debtor's ability to shield her interest in the Property Settlement from her creditors,
that was her decision .

...
~

@

ss Id.
89 See Utah Code Ann. §788-5-505(l)(b).
90
Trustee's Exs. I and 2.
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,...
8.

The Property Settlement is Not Exempt Under Utah Code Ann. 788-5505(1 )(a)(xv).

Section 788-5-S0S(l)(a)(xv) states that "an individual" is entitled to claim the
following property exempt: "[T]he interest of any money or other assets payable to an
li;i

alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order as those tenns are defined in
Section 4 l 4(p), Internal Revenue Code[.]" (emphasis added). The tenn "alternate payee"
is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 414(p){8) as "any spouse, former spouse, child or other
dependent of a participant [under a pension plan covered under the Internal Revenue
Code] who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or
a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant [in the
pension plan]." The term "qualified domestic support order" is defined in 26 U.S.C. §
414(p)(l) -(3).
The Debtor has claimed that, despite the limitations of subsection (xiv), she may
claim an exemption in the Property Settlement under subsection (xv) as a result of her
alternate payee status. By its plain terms, subsection (xv) does not apply to the Debtor
because she is not the individual who holds an interest in money that is ''payable" to an
alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, or "QDRO". 91 Under the
express language of this Section, therefore, the individual entitled to this exemption is not
the alternate payee, but the payor.

91

As the Debtor admits, a QDRO did not exist on the Petition Date in this case. Record
at 87-88, 220.
23
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The Debtor has asserted that subsection (xv) applies because she is both the
"individual" and the "alternate payee." 92 The plain language of the statute does not
support this interpretation. There is nothing in subsection (xv) indicating that the
exemption applies to the "individual" as "alternate payee," as suggested by the Debtor.
Had that been the intent, the legislature could have specifically included such qualifying
language in the statute. 93 The legislature did not do so, and such language cannot be
imputed to the statute to change its plain meaning.
Additionally, to accept the Debtor's interpretation of section (xv) would render the
@ ,._

limitations of subsections Section (xiv) and (l)(b)(i) moot. Section (b)(i) expressly states
that subsection (xiv) does not apply to retirement funds in the hands of an alternate payee
under a qualified domestic relations order. 94 Under the Debtor's interpretation of
subsection (xv), the limitation in subsection ( 1)(b)(i) would be effectively invalidated
because an alternate payee-debtor could always claim an unlimited exemption in property
under subsection (xv). This is an impermissible reading of the statute. 95 The legislature

92
93

~

@
94

...
@

9S

Record at 89.
See Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv), which specifically provides an example
of such qualifying language "any money or other assets held for or payable to the
individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan .... " (emphasis added); See also
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there"); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-242
(1989).
Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-505( I )(b)(i).
See, e.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 133 S.Ct. I 166, 1181-82 (2013) ('''[a]
statute should be constructed so that effect is given to all of its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."') (internal citations
omitted).
24
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,..
purposefully excluded an alternate payee debtor's interest from the retirement funds
exemption. Such an exclusion is not unreasonable, as funds payable to an alternate payee
do not necessarily retain the legal characteristics of "retirement funds," and can be
withdrawn at any time, for any purpose, without penalty. 96
Finally, even if the statute could somehow be interpreted to support the Debtor's
argument, the Debtor is still not entitled to the exemption because the Debtor was not an
alternate payee on the Petition Date. Exemptions are determined as of the Petition

,...

Date. 97 The Debtor had not obtained a direct interest in the 401 (k) on the Petition Date,
and on the Petition Date no QDRO had been entered designating the Debtor as an
alternate payee. 98 Thus, even if an individual could be entitled to an exemption based
solely upon a designation as an "alternate payee", an assertion unsupported by the facts
of this case and the plain language of the statute, the Debtor would not qualify for such
exemption. As of the Petition Date, the Debtor had an equitable right to the distribution
of marital property, and the contractual right to payment of the value of the Property
Settlement, neither of which are subject to exemption under (xv). The Debtor could have
taken steps to protect her interest in the Property Settlement prior to filing her bankruptcy
petition. However, she made the affirmative decision to file her bankruptcy petition

,..,
96

97

98

See Clark v. Rameker, 135 S.Ct. 2242, 2247 (2014); In re Kizer, 539 B.R. 316, 325-26

(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2015).
11 U.S.C. § 541; see also Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305,314, n.6 (1991); In re Parks,
255 B.R. 768, n. 3 (Bankr. Utah 2000)(citing In re Marcus, 1 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.
1992)) (''A determination of what property is included in the estate, as well as what
property is exempt, is measured as of the date of filing.").
Record at 88.

@

-.
~
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•
before doing so, and may not now retroactively exempt the Property Settlement from her

•

bankruptcy estate.

CONCLUSION
The Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement is non-exempt prope1ty of the
Debtor's bankruptcy estate. The Debtor cannot retroactivel y change the nature of her
interest to remove it or exempt it from her bankruptcy estate .

•

Dated this 16th day of October, 2017.

DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

Pegg
Micha r'F. Thomson
Megan K. Baker
Attorneys for Trustee alld Appellee
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•
•
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